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#### Shut down nearly decimated investor confidence in Mexican export industry—

Paterson 10-11-13 Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur // October 11, 2013 // Business & Technology “U.S. crisis unsettles Mexico” [http://newspapertree.com/articles/2013/10/11/us-crisis-unsettles-mexico] [MG]

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government is unsettling the Mexican economy. As the crisis took shape last week, the Mexican peso dipped to 13.34 units per dollar, an amount which represented the second largest depreciation in 2013. The pending October 17 showdown over the U.S. debt limit is likewise contributing to the jitters, said Gabriela Siller, an analyst for Mexico-based Banco Base. In the Mexico-U.S. border region, Mexican business leaders expressed worry that the political gridlock on the Potomac could deepen and trigger devastating consequences on the assembly-for-export, or maquiladora, industry. In Ciudad Juarez and other border cities, the foreign-owned maquiladora sector constitutes a dominant or major part of the economy. Longer export times, reduced market demand and idled assembly lines are among the concerns voiced by Ciudad Juarez business representatives. “The economy is flowing at the moment, but we don’t know how it is going to behave at the end of the year,” said Rodolfo Martinez Garza, president of the Association of Customs Agents in Ciudad Juarez. Martinez added that the last quarter of the year is the biggest season of import-export activity, and that unstable economic circumstances could result in stagnation. “There is a lot of uncertainty for investment and this is very negative for Ciudad Juarez,” Martinez said. According to Mexico’s National Council of the Maquiladora Industry and Export Manufacturing, any effects of the U.S. shutdown should be measurable in industrial production after October 20. Thomas Fullerton, economist for the University of Texas at El Paso, said the impacts of the U.S. government shutdown on the maquildora industry – which also supports thousands of jobs in his city – could be worse than the previous one in 1995-96 because of the still-incomplete recovery from the 2008 economic crash. The U.S. crisis comes at a time when worries already exist over the state of the Mexican economy and the tax reform looming in the Mexican Congress, including a possible hike in the border region sales tax from its current 11 percent to 16 percent. In Ciudad Juarez, many business, community and political leaders oppose the sales tax hike and warn of an outflow of pesos to neighboring Texas and New Mexico, where sales taxes are much lower, if the Mexican Congress increases the tax this fall under the proposal advanced by the Pena Nieto administration. This week, a coalition of popular organizations, tire and used car industry groups delivered at petition with 12,733 signatures against the sales tax hike to Congresswoman Martha Beatriz Cordoba. A member of the Citizen Movement party, Corboba has emerged as a leader against a higher tax. The political turmoil and debates in both Washington and Mexico City occur at a moment when indicators reveal some adverse trends in the Mexican economy. On October 8, the International Monetary Fund projected that Mexico’s 2013 growth rate would be a mere 1.2 percent – far less than the growth in the 3 percent range widely predicted earlier in the year. In the Latin American and Caribbean group of nations, Mexico’s growth performance puts it in the same general camp this year as Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. Agustin de la Torre, chief economist for the World Bank, was surprised by the weak Mexican growth report. “We do not have an easy explanation on why Mexico did not recuperate,” de la Torre said. “Without a doubt, there is an enormous contrast between the perception that investors have of Mexico in light of structural reforms on the one hand and the low growth this year on the other.”

#### Neito tax reform uniquely places sustainability at risk—

Replogle 9-20-13 Jill Replogle, Fronteras Reporter, KPBS “Mexico Fiscal Reform Could Be Bad For Maquiladoras” [<http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/sep/20/mexico-fiscal-reform-could-be-bad-maquiladoras/>] [MG]

The maquiladora export industry that’s a key component of the U.S.-Mexico border economy could face major changes under proposed reforms to Mexico’s tax system. Mexico currently collects fewer taxes from its citizens and companies than almost any other developed country. Mexico relies heavily on revenues from its state-run oil industry, which is in decline. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto wants to change this. One way he wants to do it is by tightening control over the country’s vast maquiladora export industry. Factories that make and export goods to the U.S. and other foreign markets currently don’t pay taxes on their raw materials and machinery. But that would change under the proposed reform. Maquiladoras would have to pay the normal 16 percent sales tax on their raw materials and then request a refund of that money when they export the final product. That would require exporters to invest a lot more cash up front, said Héctor Vega, a tax partner with Deloitte Mexico. It could erase some of the advantage Mexico has over its manufacturing competitors, Vega said. “Because we are very close to the U.S., it’s very natural doing business,” he said. “However, this 16 percent will impact a lot and maybe determinate where you put your investment, either in China, either in Vietnam, either in Malaysia or keep it in Mexico.” Still, Vega is hopeful that the tax change affecting maquiladoras will ultimately be stripped from the final fiscal reform bill.

#### Collapse threatens national security—altering engagement policy is critical to sustain it

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious national security issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a border of nearly 2,000 miles, and trade between them is worth billions of dollars. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the United States should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include altering customs and trade policies, providing economic incentives in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and creating labor opportunities for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

#### This threatens the entire relationship and causes industries to shift toward China—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

The Problem Frame highlights the issues that must be addressed in order to transform current conditions into the desired end state.25 In this case, the desired end state is a more stable economy in the northern Mexican states, free from the current stress brought about by the decline in the maquiladora industry. Since 60% of Mexican maquiladoras operate in the border states, this end state is a key factor in the stability of the border area for both the United States and Mexico.26 Additionally, 80% of all Mexican exports are to the United States, making this relationship extremely important.27 It is in the best interest of these nations to take action to reach this end state. In order to develop future courses of action that create conditions conducive for the desired end state, the current challenges that currently exist in this system must be examined. The three major challenges to reaching the desired end state are connected to flaws in the Mexican export industry, specifically its inability to respond to global competition, its overreliance on the American market, and its lack of complexity. A fourth challenge is connected to the free flow of labor in this region. These challenges are obstacles in the path to a stable and secure northern Mexico. First of all, Mexico’s response to increased competition for its maquiladoras has been completely inadequate. Over the past decade, China has presented an attractive alternative to Mexican maquiladoras in terms of labor costs. In 2008, Chinese hourly manufacturing wages were estimated nearly 75% cheaper than those in Mexico.28 For over a decade, Chinese factories have been able to assemble goods of equal quality as the maquiladoras, but now they can provide greater quality control and better physical infrastructure.29 As drug violence continues in Mexico, security has become a greater decision point for businesses as well, and many are concerned that investing in Mexico is a risk.30 Mexico’s two main responses to this situation have been extremely inadequate and have not improved the overall situation. The Mexican government’s first response was to escalate anti-Chinese rhetoric, even working to delay China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.31 This merely delayed the inevitable and resolved nothing. Later, driven by the need to compete with China, Mexican factories laid off personnel and cut worker salaries in order to reduce labor costs.32 Considering the weak global economy, this unfortunate move added pressure to an already-stressed workforce. The resultant increases in unemployment and underemployment, combined with reduced salaries, will increase instability in the region as people are driven to crime, either as victims or participants.33

#### US reliance on Chinese technology for military purposes undermines its capability and allows for Chinese espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Another way that China is gaining a strategic advantage over the U.S. is by getting the U.S. military to become increasingly dependent upon them. According to Forbes, now the U.S. military is even leasing a Chinese satellite for communications purposes… American dependence on China grows by the day. The latestnews is that the United States has been reduced to leasing a Chinese satellite to handle communications with U.S. military bases in Africa. Surprising, isn’t it? The nation that launched the world’s first communications satellite (I remember it well – it was called Telstar) has so lost its manufacturing mojo that it has to rely on its most formidable military adversary to provide the hardware for some of its most sensitive communications. This at a time when underlying unemployment rates among U.S. manufacturing workers remain at near-depression levels. Isn’t that crazy? And a recent Senate report discovered that many of our most advanced weapons systems are absolutely riddled with counterfeit Chinese parts… A recent Senate report, titled Inquiry Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain, “uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems.” The investigation found 1,800 cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over one million suspect parts in 2009-10 alone, thereby exposing “a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unveiled independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive systems.” The report concluded, among other things, that China is the “dominant source” of counterfeit products that enter the DoD supply chain, that the Chinese government does little to stop it and that the DoD doesn’t know the “scope and impact” of these parts on critical defense systems. Who in the world would be stupid enough to allow one of their greatest strategic enemies to supply large numbers of parts for key weapons systems? Apparently we are that stupid. Things are particularly bad when it comes to semiconductors… Senator John McCain commented: “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.” Calling the issue “a ticking time bomb,” Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association, commented: “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril.” It would be bad enough if we just had to worry about counterfeit parts failing. But what if China has a way to shut some of those parts down in the event of a conflict? What if some of those parts contain “Trojan Horse” computer chips or malware? That may sound crazy, but unfortunately Trojan Horse chips can be extremely difficult to detect. The following is from a recent Forbes article… As the Defense Science Board pointed out, Trojan Horse circuitry is almost impossible to detect even with the most rigorous analysis. This is particularly so if a saboteur can accomplish matching subversions in both software and relevant hardware.

#### Chinese espionage is the biggest internal link to Chinese military modernization

U.S.-China ESRC 7 – U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission[Report to Congress-The Commission was made up of members of the 110th Congress, 1st Session, November, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf>The pace and success of China’s military modernization continue to exceed U.S. government estimates**.** Indeed, on occasion the U.S. defense and intelligence communities have been taken by surprise, 7 as in the case of the launching of the Jin class submarine by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense industry is producing new generations of weapon platforms with impressive speed and quality, and these advancements are duein partto the highly effective manner in which Chinese defense companies are integrating commercial technologies into military systems. Additionally, industrial espionage provides Chinese companies an added source of new technology without the necessity of investing time or money to perform research. Chinese espionage in the United States, which now comprises the single greatest threat to U.S. technology, is straining the U.S. counterintelligence establishment. This illicit activity significantly contributes to China’s military modernization and acquisition of new capabilities.

#### US can no longer win the war due to Chinese tech advancement through espionage

Snyder 5/29/13 – (Michael, “Why The Next War With China Could Go Very Badly For The United States”, http://www.infowars.com/why-the-next-war-with-china-could-go-very-badly-for-the-united-states/)//javi

Most Americans assume that the U.S. military is so vastly superior to everyone else that no other nation would ever dream of fighting a full-scale war against us. Unfortunately, that assumption is dead wrong. In recent years, the once mammoth technological gap between the U.S. military and the Chinese military has been closing at a frightening pace. China has been accomplishing this by brazenly stealing our technology and hacking into our computer systems. The Pentagon and the Obama administration know all about this, but they don’t do anything about it. Perhaps the fact that China owns about a trillion dollars of our national debt has something to do with that. In any event, today China has the largest military in the world and the second largest military budget in the world. They have stolen plans for our most advanced jets, helicopters, ships and missile systems. It is estimated that stealing our technology has saved China about 25 years of research and development. In addition, China is rapidly developing a new generation of strategic weapons that could potentially enable it to actually win a future war against the United States. At one time such a notion would have been unthinkable, but as you will see below, the next war with China could go very badly for the United States.

#### Chinese military modernization causes nuclear war

Twomey 9, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both @ the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 [Christopher, Arms Control Association, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism#Twomey]

China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless, their modernization and sizing decisions increasingly are framed with the other in mind. Nuclear weapons are at the core of this interlocking pattern of development. In particular, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council expanding its arsenal; it is also enhancing its arsenal. The basic facts of Chinese strategic modernization are well known, if the details remain frustratingly opaque. China is deploying road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles, giving it a heighted degree of security in its second-strike capability. It is beginning to deploy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It is researching a wide range of warhead and delivery systems technologies that will lead to increased accuracy and, more pointedly, increased penetration against ballistic missile defenses. The size of China's deliverable arsenal against the United States will undoubtedly increase beyond the few dozen that it possessed recently.[1] The pace of growth thus far has been moderate, although China has only recently developed reliable, survivable delivery systems. The final endpoint remains mired in opacity and uncertainty, although several score of deliverable warheads seems likely for the near term. These developments on the strategic side are coupled with elements of conventional modernization that impinge on the strategic balance.[2] The relevant issue, however, is not simply an evaluation of the Chinese modernization program, but rather an evaluation of the interaction of that modernization with U.S. capabilities and interests. U.S. capabilities are also changing. Under the provisions of START and SORT, the United States has continued to engage in quantitative reductions of its operational nuclear arsenal. At the same, there is ongoing updating of warhead guidance and fusing systems. Ballistic missile defense systems of a variety of footprints are being deployed. The U.S. SSBN force now leans more toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, reversing the Cold War deployment. Guam's capacity to support heavy bombers and attack submarines has been enhanced. Furthermore, advances in U.S. conventional weaponry have been so substantial that they too promise strategic effects: prompt global strike holds out the promise of a U.S. weapon on target anywhere in the world in less than an hour and B-2s with highly accurate weapons can sustain strategic effects over a campaign. What are the concerns posed by these two programs of dynamic strategic arsenals? Most centrally, the development of the strategic forces detailed above has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S. revolution in precision guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile force. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China's ICBM force and quantitative buildups in its regional missile arsenals.[3] Beijing's new submarine-based forces further enhance the security of China's second-strike capability in the face of a potential U.S. strike but are likely to lead to increased attention to anti-submarine warfare in the United States. China's recent anti-satellite test provoked a U.S. demonstration of similar capabilities. Such reciprocal responses have the potential to move toward a tightly coupled arms race and certainly have already worsened threat perceptions on each side. The potential for conflict is not simply that of inadvertent escalation; there are conflicts of interests between the two. Heightening threat perceptions in that context greatly complicates diplomacy. Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

### 1ac – plan

#### The United States federal government ought to offer financial assistance toward the assembly-for-export industry in Mexico.

### Contention 2: Manufacturing

#### Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. Foreign investment brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

#### US financial assistance is key for manufacturing

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Investment is critical for relations —Key to solve border security, trafficking, and the economy

Rapiey ‘11 Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 [MG]

The relevant policy drivers for the United States government are preserving stability along its border, curbing illegal immigration, maintaining a strong domestic economy, and building productive relationships with Mexico.20 It should be immediately noted that these goals can come into conflict with one another. For example, although maintaining a thriving economy entails ensuring that U.S. businesses have the opportunity to engage in deals that are the most lucrative, abandoning current relationships with Mexican factories could negatively affect relations between the two countries. Current initiatives to secure the Southern border and curb illegal immigration might also affect how the U.S. interacts with Mexico in the economic or anti-drug arenas. Mexico’s goals are extremely similar to those of the United States. Security and stability along its border, a strong domestic economy, and building strong relations with the U.S. are all high priorities for the Mexican government. Illegal immigration, although a contentious issue for the United States, is not bothersome for Mexico.21 Although nearly identical on the surface, the Mexican goals involve different priorities than those of the U.S. For example, a strong domestic economy for Mexico means a continuance of the large amount of remittances from Mexicans in the United States.22 It also concerns focusing its industry on the production of goods for domestic consumption and focusing on high-tech indigenous models.23 For Mexico, “building strong relations” with the United States involves the receipt of assistance, whereas for the U.S., such relations mean increased cooperation on terrorism and illegal immigration.24 The differences in tendencies and goals for the actors in this system will become the center of analysis during the Problem Frame.

#### Mexican manufacturing is critical to address challenges facing the U.S. – picks up the slack for U.S. manufacturing

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

In the last decade, Mexico has proven that it has the capabilities and talent in advanced manufacturing to supply the international market of the aerospace industry. The integration of design and advanced manufacturing capabilities on a national level prove that the Mexican industry has included high technology and engineering in its processes. Through the projects identified in this Road Map, which involves the efforts of academia, industry and government, Chihuahua will become the leading A+D cluster in Latin America in precision manufacturing for the high-tech industry and dual-use goods. This exercise identified projects and factors that will promote Chihuahua’s ability to attract future high technology investments for the aerospace and defense sector by as well as creating the capabilities to optimize the sector’s industrial competitiveness in the region, such as: the creation of a talent management platform; reducing dependency on the importation of molds, dyes and tooling in the sector; and making better use of future investments that have been encouraged by Mexico’s acceptance in the WA. Chihuahua has been able to determine the right path to reach its maximum potential and become one of Mexico´s most competitive regions in the aerospace sector with a medium- and long-term vision. The road to success has been forged, and the coming years will be bursting with opportunities and new challenges for Chihuahua.

#### Mexico is key – the US can’t solve

Bañuelos et al 12 (Carlos Guzmán Bofill, Ana María Rivas Llamas, Carlos Casas Guerrero, Juan Ángel Vargas Plata, Juan Carlos Téllez Girón Barrón, Luis Anthony Olivé Hawley, Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos, Natalia Herrero Martínez, Izael Mijangos González, June, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States. The creation of the SCE and Mexico’s acceptance into the WA have laid the foundation to guarantee national surveillance during the export of restricted and dual-use technologies and goods. According to conservative estimates, the WA will enable the national industry to access a potential high-technology export market of close to an additional 11.3 billion dollars per year, added to the potential creation of between 30 and 40 thousand highly paid jobs in the next five years.7 Chihuahua’s advanced manufacturing vocation (landing gears, fuselages, engines, harnesses and precision machining) make it the ideal destination for projects in the A+D cluster. Furthermore, the Federal Government is in negotiations with the US Department of Defense to develop a regional aerospace and defense manufacturing block focused on Buy NAFTA. This could be completed with the signing of a MoU between the US Department of State and the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)

#### Manufacturing drives innovation and pharmaceuticals

Swezey 11 (Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Tech innovation solves extinction

Zhong 07, CEO at Jade Bird Dashing, 7-31-7 (Roger, “The Effects and Influences of Technology on Society and Humyn Kind,” http://scienceray.com/technology/applied-science/the-effects-and-influences-of-technology-on-society-and-humyn-kind/”)

The question that persists however, is, “Is technology in fact harming our society as a whole?” Albeit the fact that this is a remarkably intricate question of sorts, it can be answered with a simple answer. The actuality of this situation remains that technology is by no means detrimental to our society here in the United States, civilization throughout the world, or to the greater humynity of the humyn race; instead, it is vital to its survival. Nuclear Technology To illustrate this point, let us first examine an exceedingly significant technological advance of our time, nuclear technology. Nuclear technology is research that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. It has many vital applications in modern society, the most prominent of which are nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine, and nuclear power. The most controversial of these is, without a doubt, nuclear weapons. First created by the United States in 1945 during World War II, they were developed out of the fear that Nazi Germany would first develop them. A weapon of incredible power, a single nuclear weapon has to potential to decimate, level, and destroy an entire city. The first and only times a nuclear weapon has been used are in World War II, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the “Little Boy” and “Fat Myn” bombs, respectively. The usage of these bombs allowed for the near instantaneous end to the destructive World War II. Although two cities were leveled and many lives were lost, the situation involving the usage of these nuclear weapons is not nearly as negative as one may perceive. Had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would not have surrendered, and it would have without a doubt prolonged the war for months or even years. This would have forced an Allied Forces ground invasion of Japan in an effort to end the war, which would have resulted in the loss of many more people than caused by the deployment of the two nuclear weapons. When you look at the usage of nuclear technology, you must look at the situation from the viewpoint of humyn society as a whole, and not from a standpoint of an individual. While the nuclear bombs destroyed two cities and killed many, they ended a horrific World War II and prevented the loss of many other lives. Today, in more modern terms, nuclear weapons play a huge role in our lives. As citizens of the United States, it is common knowledge that we are guaranteed many degrees of freedoms and rights, but have you ever considered who enforces our right to these freedoms in the world? The military might of the United States is the key to us retaining our democratic freedoms. Being in possession of nuclear weapons is not only a positive thing, it allows for us to be free. By holding an arsenal of nuclear weapons, we have a nuclear deterrent. In this sense, we prevent wars and conflicts from escalating into another World War by instituting world order. By having nuclear technology, we are ensuring the well-being, longevity, and freedoms of the humyn race. Internet Technology Another prominent technological innovation that well represents our society today is the Internet. The Internet is the worldwide, publicly accessible network of interconnected computer networks that transmit data between themselves. It is an extremely large network that consists of countless smaller networks. The World Wide Web is accessible only through this Internet infrastructure which allows us our access to websites, email, file sharing, downloads, and media. As well as being an important provider for us common citizens who wish to access the World Wide Web, the internet serves a much greater purpose. It allows for the sharing of information almost instantaneously between scholars, researchers, and others. It allows for information to be shared from the United States to China in less than a second. Before the times of the internet, the other alternatives to transmit information were not nearly as efficient or effective. The Internet allows for us to, in some ways make the world smaller. In the days of today’s stock markets, financial infrastructure, global news organizations, powerful militarizes, strong governments and big corporations, instantaneous communication is an asset we can not afford to lose. The Internet allows for our society in modern day times to interconnect and promote globalization and information sharing. Medical Technology Perhaps one of the most vital technological advances in our society today is in the field of humyn medicine and health sciences. This field deals with the maintenance, prolongment, and restoration of humyn health through the study, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and injury. Medicine is an area where knowledge is obtained, then applied to treatment. It has been around at least as far as the beginning of recorded history, perhaps even farther. Today, modern medicine is practiced within a well-developed framework of health-care infrastructure. Research in the field of medicine has allowed for the development of many new treatments, drugs, medicines, and solutions that have allowed for the dramatic prolongment of the humyn lifespan. Today, with the influence of medicine, the lifespan of the average humyn is only increasing. Medicine in today’s world provides the most vital of all services; it ensures the survival of the humyn race as a whole. Review Now, let us review the implications of technology on our civilization here on Earth as a whole. Could the notion of technology possibly have any basis? Simply put, it does not have any credibility of any sort. Technology itself does not signify any concrete object or thing; instead it collectively portrays humyn kind’s achievements as a whole. Any advancements, abilities, creations, undertakings, views, or knowledge of us as humyns are in essence technology. This definition alone refutes the argument that technology is detrimental. Take for instance the three significant technological advances of the humyn race covered in this article: nuclear technology, the internet, and medicine. Nuclear technology, an important advancement for our society, creates a world order, protects the inhabitants of the world, and ensures the longevity, freedoms, and well-being of the entire humyn race. Also, the internet allows for our society to inter-connect and progress further into enlightenment. Perhaps most important of all, medicine, allows for us to ensure our own survival on this planet. These three technologies well represent technology as a whole, and clearly show that technology is extremely beneficial to our society. Only by advocating and advancing technology, can we as humyns, and as humynity, succeed.

#### Mexican pharmaceuticals are key

NAPS 4/11/13 (North American Production Sharing Incorporated, <http://www.napsintl.com/news/index.php/2013/04/11/the-medical-device-industry-manufacturing-in-mexico-has-a-clean-bill-of-health/>)

[Medical device](http://www.napsintl.com/medicaldevice.php) companies manufacturing in Mexico continue to exhibit steady growth with no sign of a slow down in sight. As costs in the United States and Eastern Europe continue to rise, especially with the implementation of “Obamacare” and its direct impact on medical device companies, more organizations are considering [manufacturing in Mexico](http://www.napsintl.com/manufacturinginmexico.php) as a viable solution. No other place in Mexico is this more evident than in Tijuana, where they now claim the largest concentration of medical device companies in all of North America. The ability to provide both timely deliveries and consistently high quality products are a few reasons why medical device manufacturers are choosing Mexico. Also, there is a tremendous base of talented labor with experience in medical device, [automotive](http://www.napsintl.com/auto.php), electronics, aerospace and other sophisticated industries to support the growth of manufacturing in Mexico. Furthermore, the labor laws in Mexico provide companies much more flexibility in terms of compensation, scheduling and seasonality, which plays an important roll on profitability. Another factor drawing medical device manufacturers to Mexico is the government’s enforcement, and employee’s respect, for intellectual property. Unlike many other low-cost manufacturing countries, Mexico is known for its low piracy rates, which cost companies billions of dollars a year. One of the challenges facing these companies is understanding the business landscape and culture in Mexico, which is why many of these firms are choosing to outsource their administration and compliance management to shelter companies. A good shelter company will handle 100% of the administration, including Humyn Resources in Mexico, Payroll in Mexico, Accounting in Mexico, Import/Export in Mexico and Environmental, Health & Safety in Mexico, allowing the manufacturer to focus on production and quality control. “We are receiving a record number of inquires from medical device manufacturers around the world who want to explore Mexico as a competitive solution,” said Scott Stanley, Sr. Vice President of North American Production Sharing, Inc. (NAPS), Tijuana’s largest and most sophisticated shelter service provider. “NAPS guides these companies through the process of feasibility by providing all the facts and figures about expanding into Mexico so sound business decisions can be made. Thereafter, we essentially become partners and typically work together for many years.” With an increase in demand for medical device products, not only in the United States but also within Mexico’s public health sector, Mexico will continue to be the primary choice for medical device manufacturing.

#### Pharmaceuticals is key to the development of DOD non-lethal chemical weapons

The Sunshine Project 03 (“Pentagon Perverts Pharma with New Weapons”, http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr110203.html)

The conventional view is that pharmaceutical research develops new ways to treat disease and reduce humyn suffering; but the Pentagon disagrees. Military weapons developers see the pharmaceutical industry as central to a new generation of anti-personnel weapons. Although it denied such research as recently as the aftermath of the October theater tragedy in Moscow, a Pentagon program has recently released more information that confirms that it wants to make pharmaceutical weapons. And on February 5th, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went a big step further. Rumsfeld, himself a former pharmaceutical industry CEO (1), announced that the US is making plans for the use of such incapacitating biochemical weapons in an invasion of Iraq (see News Release, 7 February 2003). The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the US Army's Soldier Biological Chemical Commynd (SBCCOM) are leading the research. Of interest to the military are drugs that target the brain's regulation of many aspects of cognition, such as sense of pain, consciousness, and emotions like anxiety and fear. JNLWD is preparing a database of pharmaceutical weapons candidates, many of them off-the-shelf products, and indexing them by manufacturer. It will choose drugs from this database for further work and, according to Rumsfeld, if President Bush signs a waiver of existing US policy, they can be used in Iraq. Delivery devices already exist or are in advanced development. These include munitions for an unmynned aerial vehicle or loitering missile, and a new 81mm (bio)chemical mortar round. Many of the Pentagon’s so-called "nonlethal" (bio)chemical weapons candidates are pharmaceuticals. Different names are used for these weapons ("calmatives", "disabling chemicals", "nonlethal chemicals", etc.). Used as weapons, all minimally aim to incapacitate their victims. They belong to the same broad category of agents as the incapacitating chemical that killed more than 120 hostages in the Moscow theater. That agent was reported to be based on fentanyl, an opiate that is also among the weapons being assessed by JNLWD. In the US, pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutica. Remifentanil, a closely related drug, is a GlaxoSmithKline product. US military contractors have identified a host of other agents manufactured by a Who's Who list of the pharmaceutical industry. In 2001 weapons researchers at the Applied Research Laboratory of Pennsylvania State University assessed the anesthetic drugs isoflurane and sevoflurane, produced by Syngenta and Abbott Laboratories, respectively. The same Penn State team recommended other drugs for "immediate consideration," some of which are in the chart below. The Pentagon is also interested in industry’s new ways to apply (bio)chemicals through the skin and mucous membranes, which could bring previously impractical drug weapons closer to reality by overcoming technical hurdles related to delivery of certain agents.

#### Those are good – prevent collateral damage

Alexander 99, Retired U.S. Army colonel, an author, and a consultant to various U.S. government agencies. He spearheaded the research on nonlethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1999 (John B., Oct 1st, “Nonlethal Weapons: When Deadly Force Is Not Enough”, The Futurist, L/N)

The military and law enforcement situations mentioned so far are fairly clear cut and a logical extension of current practices. However, the future of nonlethal weapons lies in far more important areas. Many of the potential enemies of the future are nontraditional. In the past few years the impact of terrorism and organized crime has been felt around the world. In most cases, response by means of conventional force is unsuitable or inadequate. When the enemy commingles with an innocent civilian population, it is not appropriate, and often counterproductive, to use bombs or missiles to attack them. As was seen earlier this year in Yugoslavia, even precision weapons can occasionally go astray and hit an unintended target. Without the development of advanced nonlethal weapons, the options available to political leaders and military commynders are too limited. It is under circumstances in which lethal weapons could lead to much broader engagements that nonlethal weapons take on strategic importance. An example of a situation that seems to have gone tragically wrong is the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical company in Sudan. This attack was undertaken based on a belief that the factory was supporting Osama bin Laden, a terrorist who had allegedly instigated and coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The factory, located near the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum, was hit by cruise missiles at night in hopes that civilian casualties would be minimal. It was later learned that the factory was targeted on erroneous information and that people did die in the attack. This incident highlights the limitations of conventional weapons. In the future we need to have weapons that can degrade or destroy such facilities without the collateral damage caused by high explosives. Very few of these weapons are being thoroughly researched. However, with some effort more weapons can be developed to make long-range, nonlethal strikes against terrorist infrastructures.

#### That prevents a world war

Close 98, Arab affairs specialist for the CIA for twenty-six years & an independent consultant on the region, 1998 (Raymond, “The Only Effective Defense Against Terrorism is To Rebuild America's Reputation For Fairness,” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November)

Despite U.S. government claims to the contrary, there is, in my opinion, a serious question whether our action in bombing alleged terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan was a justifiable violation of the accepted and respected norms of international law. The attacks were on the sovereign territory of another legally recognized state with which we are technically at peace. We can attempt to justify this action by quoting Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" on the American government and the American people, without distinction between them. But that is to claim, is it not, that the government of Afghanistan and the government of the Sudan abetted, and therefore share complicity in, acts of war against the United States? In fact, all that Afghanistan seems to have done was to provide Bin Laden with the sanctuary where the acts against us were planned. (Not the location where they were carried out.) We must now be ready to accept the full implications of this interpretation of our international rights. This means, it seems to me, that we are declaring one of two conditions to be true: A. That the United States makes the rules by which it acts in the world community. We are a law unto ourselves. Do we really want to say that? B. Or, that if one state believes it has enemies who are being granted refuge in another country, it is permissible to launch bombing attacks against those elements without the knowledge or permission of the legitimate host government. Is setting that precedent always going to redound to our benefit? Have we thought about that carefully? Most of us accept the premise that terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be defeated by brute force, but only by ideas, by persuasion, by the amelioration of its causes -- whether real or imagined. Terrorism has only one real asset, in the final analysis -- the passion and commitment of its adherents. Are humyn passions capable of being altered by cruise missiles? Having accepted that premise intellectually as reasonable and civilized, we now have to live with the fact that in other international situations in the future, others may emulate our resort to violence, taking the law into their own hands to launch attacks against other members of the international community if they feel their national interests are similarly threatened. **This is how world wars start.**

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best statistics prove

Owen 11 [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

## 2ac

### 2ac – t-toward

#### We meet – plan gives financial assistance toward Mexico

#### “Toward” is broader than “to” --- no direct contact is required

Williams 1894 – Charles F. Williams, Editor of Preview of U.S. Supreme Court Cases, The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, http://archive.org/stream/americanandengl05garlgoog/americanandengl05garlgoog\_djvu.txt

8. The word " toward," in a statute making insulting language toward a female relative of the prisoner a miti- gation of homicide from murder to manslaughter, was held not to mean simply " to," but to include insulting words about a female relative, whether she was present or absent. Hudson v. State, 6 Tex. App. 565.

#### Prefer our interpretation

#### Precision – draws a distinction between the direction and result

#### Topic education –focusing on the process of economic engagement teaches us how to construct policies

#### Default to reasonability – don’t vote negative if we don’t make the debate impossible – hard debate isn’t impossible

### 2ac – cir

#### Immigration reform doesn’t solve economy – worker influx

Sujeet Raja, 4-16-13 (“Is influx of skilled immigrants good when US jobs growth not good enough?”, The Economic Times)

Is influx of skilled immigrants good when US jobs growth not good enough? ¶ The US Congress seems determined to come together in a rare show of bipartisanship to undertake the biggest reform of immigration laws since 1986. The country is set to spread its arms wide to welcome new skilled immigrants, unskilled guest workers, students and rich entrepreneurs, with the promise of a humane approach to their lives in a new land and the guarantee of a fast route to permanent residency for those already there and disillusioned to the point of thinking it might be easier to go to space instead. But new statistics suggest that the end result may not be pretty for everybody concerned.¶ ¶ Take this conundrum: for the first time since 2008, US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) reached the statutory H-1B cap of 65,000 for the fiscal year 2014 within the first week of the filing period.¶ ¶ USCIS also received more than 20,000 H-1B petitions from those exempt from the cap under the advanced degree category, those who have graduate degrees from US universities and have received job offers. In total, USCIS received more than 1,24,000 H-1B petitions. And finally a lottery system was used to select applicants earlier this month.¶ ¶ Hold on, not so fast¶ ¶ Alright, so there is a big rush to head to the US, by both skilled immigrants and students. Hold on, though. Not so fast.¶ ¶ Take a look at a report from the Council of Graduate Schools (CGS). The number of international students applying to graduate schools in the US increased just 1% this year, after a 9% rise last year and an 11% gain in 2011. The increase was the smallest in eight years, the report said.¶ ¶ There is a 5% decline in student applications from China this year. However applications from India, which sends the second largest number of students, increased by 20%. Alright, who's surprised?¶ ¶ Let's now look at another set of numbers that definitely says more people want to come to the US. The Customs and Border Protection says there is a significant increase in illegal immigrants crossing along the southwest border: arrests are actually up 13% compared with the same time last year. It was 170,223 in 2012, and is 192,298 this year. According to the Government Accountability Office, up to 40% of those who make it over the southwest border never get caught.¶ ¶ But this conforms to pattern, because as legislation on immigration reforms near, the immigration from the South to the North intensifies. In 1986, when the US passed a reform that granted amnesty to 3 million illegal immigrants, the Border Patrol arrested 630,000 people crossing into San Diego area alone. Last year, fewer than 360,000 people were detained across the entire 2,000-mile border between the US and Mexico, and only 28,500 in San Diego.¶ ¶ Going by these numbers, one can argue that the number of students applying to US universities declined this year because of the dismal jobs scenario. Since the application process takes six months to a year, they would not have been able to take advantage of the new zest at Capitol Hill.

**Wont Pass – House GOP Wont Take a Comprehensive Bill, Piecemeal Will Delay Long Enough That the Election Kills Key Reforms, and Rubio Bailed**

By Ashley **Lopez** Florida Center for Investigative Reporting **10/29**/2013 Diaz Balart Casts Doubt On President’s New Immigration Reform Strategy Published on October 29, 2013 http://fcir.org/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-obama-house/

President Obama said in a speech at the White House last week that he would be open to the U.S. House’s approach to voting on immigration bills one by one, which could either be immigration reform’s savior or its demise. Rep. Mario Diaz Balart, R-Miami, who has been instrumental in getting immigration reform passed in the House, has been telling reporters that this change in tone is by no means a guarantee that reform will pass during this Congress.¶ A group of Republican House members are now working to get a series of bills together that most of their caucus would vote for. In order for the president to sign those bills, though, one of them would have to provide a path to citizenship for some of the million undocumented immigrants here in the U.S.¶ **But the issue of legalization remains one of the most contentious issues in the House**. It would even more contentious if a vote is taken close to the 2014 election.¶ And as The Miami Herald notes, the House’s strategy of passing bills one-by-one might prolong the process well into the upcoming election, thus **dooming immigration reform:**¶ And while Obama called for the House to pass a large bill that could then be reconciled with the Senate version, House Republicans want to approach any changes in piecemeal fashion, a process that at best would push any significant progress into next year.¶ Boehner spokesman Brendan Buck said Thursday that the House “will not consider any massive, Obamacare-style legislation that no one understands.” He said the House is committed to a deliberate, “step-by-step approach.”¶ “Obviously, there is no appetite for one big bill,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart told a group of reporters Wednesday night. The Florida Republican, who had been a member of the unsuccessful bipartisan “gang of eight,” is working with other Republicans on a set of bills that would allow undocumented immigrants to “get right with the law.”¶ Diaz-Balart avoided using the word “legalization” because it has become so politically fraught.¶ Most recently, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida, endorsed the House’s strategy. For a while, he had been behind an effort to pass comprehensive reform. Rubio was part of a bipartisan group in the Senate that wrote and helped move a comprehensive immigration reform bill through to final passage.¶ However, Rubio’s office now says he supports taking a piecemeal approach. Talking Points Memo reports:¶ The most prominent conservative supporter of sweeping immigration reform is calling on Congress to dial back the effort and instead focus on making incremental changes, delivering a significant blow to the prospects of reform. ¶ Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) now opposes a bicameral conference committee to reach a final resolution to the Senate-passed bill, his spokesman said, which anxious pro-reform advocates believe is the only feasible way to salvage the comprehensive overhaul.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell **Berman** - **10/29**/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and **there is no indication** he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

**Obamacare Thumps the Disad**

By Russell **Berman** - **10/29**/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has **thrown a wrench** into President Obama’s push for immigration reform.¶ The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have **dominated** headlines.¶ The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year.¶ “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because **we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor**,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June.¶ Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said.¶ Yet **the administration’s attention** — and message — **is clearly divided**.¶ The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website.¶ The setback is a familiar one for **immigration reform** advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law.¶ “It **is getting overshadowed**,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and **it is consuming the president’s attention**,” he said of **the healthcare rollout.**

#### Security innovation is spun by the Pentagon to conceal controversial portions in Congress

Burghardt 4/4/11 – researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area, his articles are published in many venues. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press (“With Obama and Congress Poised to Gut Social Spending, Pentagon Demands Billions in ‘Cybersecurity’ Handouts”, Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/04/with-obama-and-congress-poised-to-gut-social-spending-pentagon-demands-billions-in-cybersecurity-handouts/)//javi

For their part, the “Army and Defense Information Systems Agency referred inquiries about their proposed cyber spending to department-level officials.” And “Navy officials said they could not provide a top-line budget figure, since funding that supports Navy cybersecurity activities is scattered across several line items, as well as multiple programs, organizations and commands.” As Sternstein points out, while “the area surrounding ‘cybersecurity’ funding is gray … the various interpretations of cybersecurity spending translate into real-world financial and national security costs, budget and technology.” Defense Department spokeswoman April Cunningham told NextGov, that the Air Force “included things that we, [at the department's office of the chief information officer] categorize as IT infrastructure, or other activities–not directly information assurance.” “According to the department,” Sternstein writes, “information assurance consists of five programs, including public key infrastructure, or digital certificates, as well as defense industrial base cybersecurity for private sector assets that support the military.” Cunningham said that “activities at the Air Force and other services that Defense considers to be ‘information assurance-cybersecurity’ are captured in the total $3.2 billion figure.” And “based on this formula” the Army is seeking $432 million and the Navy are lusting after $347 million in FY2012. However, other Defense agencies “including DISA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–are asking for a cumulative $1.6 billion. Details on proposed cyber spending at all Pentagon components are shared with Congress in a classified budget book, she said.” Which means, given the Pentagon’s propensity to quietly hide their most controversial programs within the dark folds of the black budget, Congress, let alone the American people, really have no idea what such programs entail, who benefits from black contract outlays and ultimately, how they’ll be deployed. NextGov reported that the revised budget request “also includes funding for noninformation assurance activities” that the Pentagon claims “are integral to the military’s cyber posture, specifically cyber operations, security innovations and forensics.”

#### Defense spending is popular among Republicans

Kredo 3/21/13 – award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others (Adam, “GOP united on keeping defense spending intact”, Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/defending-defense/)

Republican leaders are dismissing charges that the party is fractured on national security issues following the overwhelming passage of a House GOP budget measure that fully restored recently slashed defense spending. The House on Thursday approved by a vote of 228-191 a wide-ranging budget plan authored by Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.). All but 10 Republicans voted in favor of the budget, while every Democrat voted against it. The Ryan plan would allocate about $560.2 billion in defense spending in 2014. That appropriation would all but negate the effects of the recent sequester, which eradicated millions in defense spending and threw the Pentagon into chaos. The allocation would prevent the Pentagon and United States military from being forced to implement a devastating series of cuts that would imperil not only troop readiness but also their benefits. A similar budget proposal authored by the House’s deficit-conscious Republican Study Committee (RSC) also included this level of defense spending, leading Republican leaders to dismiss charges that the party is fundamentally split on such issues. “The overwhelming conservative support for the Ryan budget and the RSC budget are the best indicators of where the Republican Party is on national security that I have seen in a while,” House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) told the Free Beacon following the vote. “After the saga of sequestration, we have come together as a party to declare that our military has been cut too much,” McKeon said. “By passing the House budget, we are making a restoration of vital national security resources a top policy priority, every bit as important as balancing the budget.”

### 2ac – eu cp

#### Production of the F-35 is uncertain – sequestration cuts

Capaccio 8/1/13 – (“Canceling Lockheed F-35 Said to Be Among Pentagon Options”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-01/canceling-lockheed-f-35-said-to-be-among-pentagon-options.html)//javi

Canceling the $391.2 billion program to build Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 fighter jet is among options the Pentagon listed in its “strategic review” of choices if forced to live with automatic budget cuts, according to people familiar with Defense Department briefings. The F-35 was a program listed for potential elimination in charts at briefings held July 31 by the Defense Department, according to the people, who asked not to be identified discussing the closed-door sessions. Scrapping the fighter wasn’t among options disclosed to reporters that day by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel as he outlined in broad terms results of the review he ordered of alternative approaches if the military must continue to absorb about $50 billion a year in cuts under the process known as sequestration. Hagel indicated the Pentagon may have to choose between a “much smaller force” and a decade-long “holiday” from modernizing weapons systems and technology. “We have gone to great lengths to stress that this review identified, through a rigorous process of strategic modeling, possible decisions we might face under scenarios we may or may not face in the future,” Pentagon spokesman George Little said in an e-mailed statement. “Any suggestion that we’re now moving away from key modernization programs as a result of yesterday’s discussion of the outcomes of the review would be incorrect.” Protecting F-35 The F-35 is the Pentagon’s costliest weapon system, with the estimated price tag of $391.2 billion for a fleet of 2,443 aircraft, up 68 percent from the projection in 2001, as measured in current dollars. The rising costs and troubles in building the plane as it’s still being developed have led to criticism in Congress. The Pentagon moved to protect the F-35 from sequestration’s initial impact this year, locking in several contracts before the cuts took effect. Frank Kendall, the Defense Department’s chief weapons buyer, has said he will continue to do his best to protect the plane built by Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed in the future. Based on that track record, “the implication is that any ‘option’ to kill the program is an academic exercise rather than a serious possibility,” according to Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the nonprofit Arlington, Virginia-based Lexington Institute. Thompson wasn’t briefed on the charts. While the Pentagon and its supporters have lobbied for relief from sequestration, President Barack Obama and congressional leaders aren’t engaged in active efforts to find an alternative to the automatic cuts.

#### Mexican production is key to US F-35s

Samra 13 – (Elena Achar Head of the Export Promotion Unit Alejandro Delgado Ayala Head of the Institutional Relations and Support Unit Carlos Eduardo Sánchez Pavón Head of the Investment and International Business Promotion Unit Martín Felipe Valenzuela Rivera Head of the Business Inteligence Unit Karla Mawcinitt Bueno Communications and Image General Coordinator Sebastián Escalante Bañuelos Director of Publications and Content, "Mexico's Aerospace Industry Road Map", ProMexico, June 2013, [www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/ROAD-MAP-Aerospace-2013.pdf](http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/ROAD-MAP-Aerospace-2013.pdf))//javi

In the defense aerospace sector, there is a trend toward association between countries to manufacture combat aircraft. Switzerland cooperates with Sweden in the development of the next generation Saab Gripen. Indonesia has joined the South Korean KFX combat aircraft program, while Turkey is looking for a partner country for its TFX combat aircraft program. The sales forecast will be dominated by the Joint Strike Fighter Lockheed Martin F-35, a project with a growing customer portfolio, with the partnership of 9 countries: United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Australia, scheduled for completion in 2019. Progress in the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be crucial for the constant concern of international partners regarding escalating costs, a key factor in the aerospace industry where Mexico can be acknowledged as a strategic option. Based on data from Aviation Week, Lockheed Martin has confirmed orders from more than 15 countries for 340 Hercules C-130 units. There are new competitors around the manufacture of this aircraft, so that delivery on time for these orders will be central to the company. In this segment, the Embraer KC-390, the Chinese plane Shaanxi Y-9, the Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) Russian/Indian and A400M are the main competitors. With regard to helicopters, the seven countries behind the Eurocopter Typhoon are expected to grant a development contract for an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) to the Selex Galileo Euroradar consortium as of 2013. On the other hand, the U.S. has commissioned Bell to replace the use of Apache AH-64E helicopters with an update. In Europe, Britain and France spend about the same percentage of GDP on defense, and together account for half of the continent’s military expenditure and their armed forces are of a similar nature. Both nations are cooperating in individual programs, such as the unmanned (UAV) Watchkeeper reconnaissance aircraft. They have made progress in the field of cyber defense and share research objectives of the English Taranis and the French Neuron aircraft. In this context of intense activity in the international scene, the development and construction of commercial and defense aircraft faces challenges of cost reduction and an emphasis on innovation, design and materials through a reliable supply chain, where Mexico emerges as a great opportunity.

#### F-35 solves Koreans war

**Laird 13** – international defense consultant and co-founder of Second Line of Defense (Robbin, “China, Korea, & The F-35: Reshaping US Forces For A Pacific Strategy”, 2/1/13, http://defense.aol.com/2013/02/01/pacific-strategy-china-korea-f-35/)

The Defense of South Korea To illustrate what we could do to shape an effective strategy, I am going to look at two "cases": reworking [South Korean defense](http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/29/mike-wynne-former-air-force-secretary-says-us-should-deploy-fi/) and leveraging the F-35 global fleet as a strategic asset. We are in the throes of change in our relationships with our South Korean ally and the North Korean threat as well. By 2015, we are scheduled to [alter the command relationships in South Korea](http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/15/korean-right-campaigns-to-keep-joint-hq-with-us/) to put the South Koreans in a greater position to command their own forces and to shape the allied capability to deal with the North Korean threat. From the US side, this means that there is a strategic opportunity as well to re-shape South Korean and American forces to contribute more to regional defense and to redesign forces which are currently designed more for static Sitzkreig than for dynamic defense. The Japanese have captured the right concept: allies need to enhance their dynamic defense. And for the US, such developments provide the opportunity to link to the type of forces Gen. Robling discussed earlier. [In an exclusive interview with us](http://www.sldinfo.com/meeting-the-korean-defense-challenge-the-view-from-7th-air-force/), the Commander of the 7th US Air Force, [Lt. General Jan-Marc Jouas](http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7809), underscored the nature of the challenge and the possibilities for transition. "We need to be able to attack in depth. We also need to be able to attack at the forward edge of the battle space. We need to be operating against targets that will create not just tactical effects, but operational and strategic. We need to be operating cross domain, and by that I mean kinetic and non-kinetic effects, one reinforcing the other. "One of our greatest advantages is our air operation center that will oversee the entire air campaign, and where I will be situated as the air component commander. "And any deployment of F-35s to the Korean peninsula will clearly modify the template, including the Marine Corps F-35B. "The Seventh Air Force relationship with the Marine Corps is the best I've ever seen. Their aircraft will be dedicated to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) at some point, but before then, they will be used as part of our air campaign to the greatest effect that we can deliver. "The F-35A, B, and C will give us greater flexibility, and greater options in terms of where and how we can operate." This leads then to the potential strategic impact of joint deployments and developments of the F-35 throughout the region. The F-35 is a C2 (command-and-control) and IW (Information Warfare) aircraft. But it is when the US deploys [the F-35 in numbers](http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/10/why-the-air-force-needs-a-lot-of-f-35s-gen-hostage-on-the-com/) that we will see the strategic impact of a tactical aircraft. The discussion of the shift from 4th to 5th generation aircraft has often missed the point of what the impact of deploying a significant number of F-35s in a region as central as the Pacific could have on the U.S. and its allies. **The F-35 can play the role of a linchpin in a 21st century Pacific strategy which is centered on and enabled by our allies**. Indeed, the F-35 as a lynchpin to interactive allied and American capabilities intersect nicely with the overall strategy whereby the United States is the key lynchpin power in the allied coalitions of the Pacific. **The concepts of operations underlying a new approach to providing lynchpin capabilities are built around the F-35. Presence, scalability, and reachback are solid foundations for the kind of deterrence necessary in the evolving strategic environment in the Pacific**. The F-35 as an Allied and American fleet brings several key and core capabilities to shaping [a new attack/defense enterprise](http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/04/crafting-a-pacific-attack-and-defense-enterprise-the-strategic-qu/), one which allows the US to play a key lynchpin role and yet, at the same time puts allies in the lead to defend themselves and their own interests. A global fleet of F-35s in the Pacific provides several significant contributions to shaping a 21st century strategy: a networked fleet, significant interoperability, multiple and diversified basing, enabling a wolfpack operational approach to leverage best value out of deployed assets, and a globally sustained fleet. [I have developed these concepts elsewhere](http://www.sldinfo.com/the-f-35-and-pacific-strategy-shaping-a-core-lynchpin/), but will focus here simply on one key element: a globally sustained fleet. The entire approach of the F-35 enables the sustainment of the fleet in radically different ways from the past. And it is coming at a time when economic pressures create such a need; but if new approaches are not taken money will be invested in maintaining less effective forces. The F-35 global sustainment approach allows for a more effective and dynamic force at less cost than operating a legacy fleet. At the heart of the new model is an inherent capability to leverage logistics hubs throughout the Pacific to create a seamless system to sustain both allied and American planes. Presence from this perspective has a whole different meaning. Hub sustainment means that the US can surge aircraft to the region and have them be supported during surge operations withouthaving to haul its sustainment assets forward with the surged aircraft, which is the requirement currently. Building a training and sustainment infrastructure in the Pacific -- with hubs and ranges in Canada and Australia, and hubs in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam -- provides an opportunity to re-shape how sustainment can be done in around the world. This will bring with it a significant boost to sortie rates and hence operational capabilities.

#### Extinction

**Chol 2**

[Director Center for Korean American Peace, 10-24, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A\_Chol.html]

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

#### More naval ships solve missile interception and delivery

\*improves c3I operations

**AFCEA 11–** Unclassified report released by The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association that serves the US military (“Information Dominance Industry Day Questions and Answers”, 4/5/11, Available Online @ http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/MasterAnswerDocument05APR11.pdf)//MM

C3I provides the backbone of command and control (C2) in all warfare areas, including BMD. The BMD mission is inherently Information Dominance-centric, and can be divided between “Left of Launch” and “Right of Launch.” In “Left of Launch”, effective cyber warfare and penetrating knowledge of the adversary are critical to shaping the battlespace. “Right of Launch” is focused on network support to the warfighter. Navy BMD C3I enables C2 to make rapid decisions inside the adversary’s decision cycle. The Navy is currently leveraging a proven and fully functioning BMD C3I architecture. Navy ships with BMD capability and key Fleet Command and Control nodes are part of the BMD system. This includes mission planning systems, sensors, fire control, and command and control centers from the tactical edge connected to the National level. In BMD, the Navy closely works with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), STRATCOM, and other services on C3I matters to ensure effective BMD is delivered from BMD-capable ships and the future Aegis Ashore, via the Regional and Fleet Commanders, to BMDS at the National level. While we have a working structure, we clearly see growing adversary threats which necessitate better performance and capacity on the part of our networks. **More ships are needed** to intercept more ballistic missiles in a complex tactical/operational environment. To this end, we are improving network capabilities and access through the addition of Advanced Time Division Multiple Access Interface Processor (ATIP) and improved integration of Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs) with Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) and Navy Multiband Terminal. We are improving BMD Mission Planning across the theater by integrating Aegis Mission Planner, MIPS-Maritime IAMD Planning System, and C2BMC. Starting in FY12 we have proposed adding 15 TF-IAMD Navy personnel with BMD expertise in each MOC.

**That’s key to solve Chinese ASBM threats**

**AFCEA 11–** Unclassified report released by The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association that serves the US military (“Information Dominance Industry Day Questions and Answers”, 4/5/11, Available Online @ http://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/MasterAnswerDocument05APR11.pdf)//MM

Adversary ballistic missiles threaten our allies worldwide and our homeland- Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and CONUS itself. Chinese development of so-called ‘carrier killer’ ASBMs compounds the Navy BMD challenge as our afloat forces become targets of exoatmospheric ballistic missiles in addition to the variety of cruise missiles and other threats we face. The Navy must integrate BMD into an effective, broader Integrated Air and Missile (IAMD) capability. The Navy Air and Missile Defense Command (NAMDC) at Dahlgren has the task to promote rapid delivery of new IAMD technologies; support development and validation of IAMD requirements for Joint and Navy processes; lead Navy IAMS concept, doctrine, and tactics development, and experimentation; and, advocate Navy positions and capabilities in Joint forums. We are closely aligned with NAMDC through the BMD roadmap as a part of the Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise. These alignments provide us the opportunities to play vital roles in IAMD, bringing important capabilities from across N2/N6. These include, on the right side of the kill chain, **improved C3I and network integration and operational coordination**. On the left side of the kill chain, this means development of constant and penetrating knowledge of the adversary and cyber skills to provide persistent access to adversary networks. Across the full kill chain, it means supporting the ability to synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic responses to give our afloat forces the confidence to operate effectively in the face of a full range of threats.

**China uses ASBM’s – causes escalation**

**Chimerica 11 –** (“Attack by an ASBM”, 2011, Chimerica War, Online @ <http://www.chimericawar.org/carrier_killer.html>)

Although it is entirely credible that China would unexpectedly strike a carrier without any warning or notable increase in regional tension this would actually be very out of character for the PLA China has a predictable history of giving many warnings before striking an opponent. Of course, this doesn’t discount commanders being so blinkered to the signs, like McCarthur and blundering on regardless, but characteristically, China can usually be counted on to give clear warning signs of an attack. In the modern age, it is more than likely that tensions would have significantly risen or actual conflict taking place before the ASBM is considered as a strike option. James Kraska’s story of a single, untraceable ASBM sinking the USS George Washington out of the blue is unrealistic and the global atmosphere is more likely to resemble Harper’s piece on Chinese Missiles and the Walmart Factor. As offensive operations rarely take place in isolation, we can confidently surmise that the US and China will have already gone through a significant ratcheting up of tensions, both economically and militarily, and any decision to hit a carrier will not be made in a bubble. Therefore, on the verge of war, the PLA will be doing everything it can to find carrier battle groups while the battle groups will be doing everything they can to slip into favorable positions un-noticed. It should be noted here that the concept of an ASBM first came about from a study where they claimed the over-the-horizon radar could differentiate between different ships by comparing, over time, the frequent air activity around the carrier. Due to this, in a heightened war-situation we can reasonably assume that the carrier will not be flying multitudes of planes if it’s moving into a potential battle position and forward air cover could easily come from fighters flying from any number of global bases and using air-refueling. The carrier will be in a high alert, probably moving at a good pace to out run subs and in complete communication silence. There are any number of war scenarios existing on what the carrier would be doing, but let’s say, for the sake of this narrative, that the carrier is moving at 28knots with only a small escort, including some Aegis, and aiming to join up with a larger group to move forward as an overwhelming battle fleet into a hot zone off China’s coast. To any over-the-horizon radar a silent, cruising carrier would be almost undistinguishable from other ships, so the PLA would need multiple positive IDs to launch an attack. On top of this, any number of carrier battle groups could be coming from a multitude of directions. The Pacific Ocean is purportedly 166million square kilometers. The Indian Ocean is 44million square kilometers. The South China Sea alone is over 3.5million square kilometers. So the analogy of, “looking for a needle in a haystack,” doesn’t even do it justice. Carriers maybe big, but on the scale of things they are infinitesimally small in a huge mass of monotone sea. Let’s say for arguments sake that the PLA detection systems and more importantly the guys working them are totally on the money and manage to nail down a battle group to a certain area. The overhead satellites are then able to pick out ships moving in a specific direction. The satellites then need to keep a track on the ships movement in real time. Not as easy as it sounds. Don’t forget, GPS works by a device actively calling out to the satellites to find it. This will not happen in a war situation, it will be a completely passive search. It will be up to the controllers, probably based somewhere deep in China’s interior, to manually control the satellites guidance system to first locate, then precisely follow and plot the battle group's direction. Let’s say that the modern Chinese satellites can lock onto the carrier and follow it automatically once it is located. This still isn’t good enough to target though. The next step is to get an over-the-horizon radar signal and preferably drones on target. At this point it is just not credible to assume that the PLA would target a carrier based on just satellite co-ordinates alone, even if numerous satellites were triangulating it. They will need some other kind of terminal guidance system to help the missiles hit the target. The margin of error on a fast moving, possibly erratic target would be too great, even for a suite of missiles. Bear in mind, conventional DF-21s missiles carrying only a 1000lb warhead and traveling at Mach 10 are going to need to hit, otherwise they’ll just make a very, very fast splash into the sea. (see here for some perspective) It would certainly put the fear of God into the sailors who saw it, but it wouldn’t stop the ships. On top of this, carriers are designed to get hit, or have planes crash into them so are incredibly durable and tough. Even a direct hit by a DF-21 with it's huge wave of kinetic energy is not guaranteed to terminally incapacitate a carrier. It would probably need multiple direct hits, then followed by sustained submarine attacks to sink it. The analogy comes to mind of getting a hand-full of glass marbles and trying to throw them into a plastic cup from a few feet away. Chances are you might get one or two in the cup if you're really good, but it's not guaranteed, and the ones that miss just don't count at all. Firing a missile from 2000km away and getting it witih 20-30metres is a fantastic shot - but it just doesn't count. It has to be a bull everytime. Let’s assume that things are going great for the PLA and it is able to get a confirmed “eyeball” sighting by a paramilitary fishing boat of the carrier. So the satellite data can now be corroborated with a first hand account that it is definitely a US carrier in the area that they're concentrating on. This of course assumes that the US Navy wouldn’t be neutralizing or jamming any boats in the vicinity, but let’s say the information gets through to the 2nd Artillery. On top of this, another lucky break happens, a PLA sub sights the carrier and also gives a confirmed sighting, but does not engage because the carrier is going too fast. The carrier could be zipping along at 30knots, with the max speed of the Jin around 20knots, if it wasn’t already cued for an attack it could only watch as it rushed by. A message is sent to other Chinese subs to rendezvous at a certain point along the carriers proposed course and lie in wait. The subs will be used in a second tier attack on the carrier after it has received a volley from the DF-21s. With two confirmed sightings and a satellite track the PLA controllers are confident that they are zeroing in on a carrier kill and send word to the Central Military Commission, 套机构两块牌子(CMC) The CMC is already in session in its war room and begins to seriously consider making a strike on the battle group given the positive identification and reliable satelite track. Word is now sent to the countless mobile DF-21s launchers across the country to get ready for a launch. Mathematicians and strategists in the PLA begin to try and predict the carrier’s route and decide upon the best place to try and launch a strike and cue up the subs for the definitive kill. Other attack platforms are readied to complement the attack once it is underway. UAVs are launched from Chinese ships and the mainland to directly locate the carrier. As the US ships draw closer, Chinese over-the-horizon radars begin to try and distinguish the carrier from the escorts. Meanwhile, off the coast of China, the multiple over-the-horizon radars light up like bonfires for the numerous US subs that are lying quietly in position, cued to strike on command at Chinese ground targets and subs. The carrier is not blindly, blundering into a Chinese trap but is part of a larger, counter trap being set by the US submarine fleet. The CMC, gets on to the Emergency Hotline to Washington and warns them that, “they can not be held responsible if any US warships enter Chinese Territorial Waters”. For Washington, this is “game-on”. They were expecting the CCP to give a final warning and they characteristically do, right on cue. All US ships in the region are put on alert that a missile attack is imminent and aimed at the incoming carrier battle groups. Minutes drain by like hours. The carrier group moves forward and despite the US Air Force shooting down a number of PLAAF stealth, UAVs, two of them slip through the net and lock onto the carrier. The carrier is now painted with exact, real-time coordinates streaming from two undetected UAVs, the over-the-horizon radar and satellite tracking. This is enough data to complete the ASBM terminal guidance system. The 2nd Artillery quickly informs the CMC that they have all the data they need to launch an attack on the incoming battle group. Time is of the essence now. The carrier needs to be neutralized before it can get in range of the Chinese mainland with its F-18s. An effective battle group can punch 600 attacks on target in just one day and repeat that for days if not weeks. It is essential that if the strike takes place it happens as soon a possible while the carrier is still far out to sea. The 2nd Artillery commanders urge their superiors that they have been incredibly lucky to have quickly amassed such reliable data and the time is now to strike hard, so as to knock the Americans onto their back foot. With a carrier sunk, or at least incapacitated, this will forestall any greater push by the Allied forces and could possibly weaken the 'fickle' US public’s will to fight. This is enough for the CMC and they order the strike. After receiving the orders, the 2nd Artillery begins to transmit the target data to the 100 DF-21s that will launch. Note: this is not a static target with fixed coordinates that they’re aiming to hit. So, the data can’t be finalized. The DF-21s will be launched into the air without the final co-ordinates in their guidance system. This will have to come later, while it’s flying at Mach 10. Which is not to be underestimated as an incredibly difficult thing to do. Fortunately, Chinese scientists have already cracked this incredibly difficult task. The 2nd Artillery’s C4ISR are confident that they can transmit to the terminal guidance system on board the warhead at the critical time using the over-the-horizon radar data, UAVs and their new, advanced satellite communications streaming. The DF-21 will launch into one orbit, then change direction and zero in on the carrier. The speed at which this is done will out maneuver the Aegis and Patriot tracking systems, that traditionally rely on predictable trajectories of missiles to intercept. The DF-21s begin to fire-up. Meanwhile, the eyes and ears of the US military are scouring China for signs of a missile launches. Just like in Iraq they have a window of detection as the missiles are readied for firing. Only this time, the US can’t strike them as they prepare, as they’re on the Chinese Mainland in protected airspace and this would be crossing a significant ‘red-line’ at this stage in the conflict. However, as soon as the birds are airborne, all bets will be off. As the mobile launchers prepare to launch all US subs in the region, including a suite of Ohio class (SSBNs) nuclear warhead carrying subs are put on high alert for imminent launch. As the Chinese missiles begin to fire up squadrons of B-52s and B1s take off from Guam, Diego Garcia and Barksdale packing conventional and nuclear weapons. Within minutes the US has hundreds of bombers in the sky. Nuclear Silos across the US go to high alert for imminent launch. Russian listening posts pick up the Chinese actions and also all the US activity and engage in similar counter measures, readying its army for a possible nuclear exchange. The minutes now quickly drain down and all the 21s are ready to fly. Final word goes out to the 2nd Artillery commander who relays this to the CMC one last time. Convinced that sinking a carrier will put the US on the back foot they decisively give the go ahead, and 50 of the 100 missiles are sent skyward. STOP… Take a second to contemplate the gravity of this scenario… At this exact moment China has launched 50, unknown sub-orbital ballistic missiles into the air. The type and destination are unknown. It could be part of an ASBM package, or it could be a preemptive nuclear strike on an unspecified country? The US, Russia, India, UK and France would all go to DEFCON One and could all release an instant nuclear counter strike on China. The world has evolved to avoid using ballistic missiles as the preferred weapon of choice in war as they could easily provoke a full blown nuclear exchange. This is why the ASBM system is so out of whack with current weapon systems. It can not be differentiated from a preemptive nuclear strike. The US is now faced with two choices, are these airborne missiles conventional or nuclear? If they believe they are nuclear then China will be on the receiving end of an unprecedented nuclear retaliatory strike by the The Allies and possibly Russia, even India. The US may also assume that these missiles are part of an ASBM package but may still be nuclear, so again it would launch nuclear weapons to counter. The US has almost no way of knowing what kind of missiles have just been launched from the mobile carriers. So much for **the ASBM** keeping the US at arms length. Instead it **has the potential to cause a nuclear exchange.** The only way China could guarantee that it wouldn’t receive a nuclear counter-strike from launching so many DF-21s into the sky is if they pre-arranged some signal to inform the US, Russia, India, France and Britain that they were only using conventional weapons. Such a system would be inherently flawed because why would anyone believe them, and if it did work it would be giving away too much intelligence. “Oh, hi, yeah, so this is Xi Xinping, yeah, um, you know those missiles we just launched well they’re conventional, not nuclear ok, so can you make your response appropriate?” A funny joke, but really, how else would you suggest China, a nuclear armed country, convince the other nuclear nations of the world that the launching of multiple, sub-orbital ballistic missiles is not a nuclear preemptive strike but is only aimed at ships? This not so very small point aside, let’s assume for the sake of the story, that the US doesn’t carry out a massive retaliatory, nuclear strike but is confident that it's only a bunch of conventional DF-21s flying at Mach 10 aimed at its carrier battle groups. Only? As soon as the birds are airborne, US subs and possibly stealth bombers off the coast will begin targeting the Chinese over-the-horizon radars, which will have two choices, keep transmitting data or risk getting hit. If they power down and relocate quickly, they may live, but the DF-21s will be left flying blind. As China has launched missiles from the mainland at the US Navy, it will no longer be considered a naval battle and the numerous subs and stealth bombers will begin attacking relevant C4ISR on the Chinese mainland. With a billion dollar carrier at stake and the lives of thousands of Americans it’s a “no brainer” now and a race against time as the US tries to take out critical Chinese infrastructure on the coast. The DF-21s, which will probably be launched from further inland will take around 12minutes to reach their target as they will first need to leave the atmosphere, and then come back down at Mach 10. Plus their target is a 1000kms out. The question will be, can the US cruise missiles take out enough critical assets to break the delicate information chain needed to bring the DF-21s down on target? Remember, only a bull counts. Near misses count for nothing, no matter how close. In unison to this missile exchange, military assets right across the Pacific Rim will go on to a maximum war footing. Militaries in Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, India, Vietnam and Russia will go to their highest alerts. More than likely, there will be air-combat in the areas around Japan as twitchy pilots from US and the JMSDF engage the PLAAF in dog fights. Across Japan, Patriot batteries stir into life and a string of 35 Aegis Cruisers from the US, Japan, Korea, and Australia brace for missile intercepts. Japan would assume that any number of these missiles could be aimed at her and would immediately begin to mobilize a counter attack.

#### Robust naval power key to US-Indian relations

Cropsey 06, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, deputy undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, (Seth, Dec, “The Global Trident”, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/12/2307414>)

The geographic pivot of the Muslim littoral is democratic India — with its minority population of 140 million Muslims. Their participation in an increasingly prosperous and successful democratic state would be persuasive far beyond the subcontinent in establishing the compatibility of Islam with democracy. A key element of U.S. maritime strategy’s focus on the Muslim littoral should be to draw India closer to the U.S. through increased military-to-military exercises, ship visits and cooperation with Indian authorities in civil assistance.India is equally important in assuring the success of democracy in Asia. India’s long-standing enmity toward China represents a physical point of intersection between the maritime strategy’s focus on the western Pacific and its role in preventing the further spread of radical Islam. The two prongs of this strategy are complemented by the third, the U.S.’s unchanging requirement to demonstrate its willingness and capability to remain a global superpower. The most convincing demonstration of American will and reach is a navy large, powerful and flexible enough to apply effective force where U.S. interests are endangered.

#### Loss of relations causes India to launch ASATs

The Space Review ’11 [May 9, 2011 India and space security, by Victoria Samson, takeaways from “Space, Science, and Security: The Role of Regional Expert Discussions,” held in New Delhi, India, from January 19–21, 2011, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1838/1>, WBTR]

The discussion of space and security is still tied to terms used to discuss nuclear weapons, at least within Indian policy circles. So when one talks about “responsible space behavior,” the Indians look at it from a proliferation perspective: their take is that since no one is proliferating space technology unduly, no one is acting irresponsibly. Alternatively, they raised the idea several times that, outside of the Chinese ASAT test, no one has acted irresponsibly in space since the Cold War ASAT tests held by the United States and the then-Soviet Union. This logic brings home the need for the international community to develop some sort of accepted definition of what responsible space behavior is, and why it helps space powers like India to be part of that discussion. Several Indian participants likened an ASAT program to a nuclear weapons program: you develop it without testing it, but you have it on hand just in case the international security environment changed and you needed it. But when asked what particular scenarios merited the use of an ASAT, no one had an answer. Also, very telling was a statement by a former foreign secretary, Kinwal Sibal, who said that “India perceives itself as a victim of geopolitics rather than an actor who provokes negative reaction.” This attitude surfaced several times over the course of the conference and was used to explain why their ASAT program should not be of concern to others. As for the United States, there was curiosity expressed by conference participants about how sincere the United States is about the international cooperation pushed for in its National Space Policy. They are looking for concrete examples that the United States is serious about reaching out to other space powers. Several participants, Indian and otherwise, said that they felt that the United States was in a decline and that would affect India’s security calculus.

#### Causes Indo-Pak war – goes nuclear

Lewis 04 - postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies

Jeffrey Lewis July 2004 “What if Space Were Weaponized?

Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf

Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be very stable.72 A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons “within the first 12 ‘days’ of the war game.” “It’s a scary scenario,” said one participant. Anti-satellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games have revealed. For example, war games that quickly escalate to nuclear use are often restarted to allow the Indian side to reconsider some of the moves that lead to Pakistani escalation. The Indian side, however, generally learns the opposite lesson and attempts a “lighting strike” to destroy the Pakistani nuclear stockpile. When asked if the Indian Armed Force could really execute a preemptive strategy, one participant noted, “Probably not, but they believe they could.”

### 2ac – dip cap

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett 07, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### CO2 isn’t key

Watts 12, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims. “Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change. Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society. For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said. For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.” There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.” Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.” Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models. But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.” Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.” Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.) Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.” He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.” He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman. Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued. Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

#### Hegemony key to solve global warming

**Cascio 08** [Jamais Cascio, 2008, Writers for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, *The Big Picture: Climate Chaos*]

The relationship between climate chaos and the rise of the post-hegemonic world is tricky. Climate disruption isn’t causing the decline of US hegemony, nor is it caused by that decline. However, global warming underscores the weakness of the American hegemony, and that the decline of American hegemony weakens the potential for a near-term coordinated response to global warming. Moreover, this decline has the potential to make dealing with climate chaos more difficult. The best example of this situation occurred at the Bali global warming conference in December. The US delegation refused to sign an agreement accepted by essentially the rest of the participants, instead arguing for its own alternative. Kevin Conrad, the delegate from Papua New Guinea, then stepped to the microphone and said this: There’s an old saying: If you are not willing to lead, then get out of the way. I ask the United States: We asked for your leadership; we seek your leadership. But if for some reason you are not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us; please get out of the way. A weakened American hegemon is one that is most likely to either try a costly attempt to shore up its power, or lash out at rising competitors, distracting national and world leadership at a time when distraction is most problematic. Of all of the risks to our global capacity to deal with global warming, this is the most dangerous.

#### No modeling

Loris 13 (An economist specializing in energy and environmental issues, Nicolas Loris is the Heritage Foundation’s Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow., 1/30/2013, "No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change", www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change)

In his second inaugural address, President Obama pledged that the United States “will respond to the threat of climate change” and will take the lead for other countries to follow suit. This commitment is a willful rejection of reality. Congress has been unwilling to address climate change unilaterally through legislation. Multilateral attempts become more futile each year as major players, especially developing nations such as China and India, refuse to play ball. And why should they? Developing nations are not going to curb economic growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face far more pressing environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding poverty and lack access to reliable electricity. This leaves the president with only one option for making good on his pledge: impose costly regulatory actions. This approach would be as pointless as unilateral legislative action. Why? Even accepting as fact the theory that Earth is warming and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent does not make any of the following true: &bull; Man-made emissions are driving climate change and are a negative externality that needs to be internalized. Greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent. But that fact doesn’t begin to settle the scientific debate about climate change and climate sensitivity — the amount of warming projected from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, viewing man-made carbon dioxide as a strictly negative externality ignores a lot of peer-reviewed literature that identifies many positive effects (e.g., plant growth, human longevity, seed enrichment and less soil erosion as a result of more robust tree root growth) associated with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. • Earth is cooking at a catastrophic rate. The media breathlessly reported that a recent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s study found 2012 to be the warmest on record for the continental United States. What they largely failed to report was that, globally, 2012 was only the ninth-warmest in the past 34 years. In fact, average global temperatures have leveled off over the past decade and a half. • Sea levels will rise dramatically, threatening America’s coastlines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, the bible of CO2-reduction proponents, projects sea levels rising 7 inches to 23 inches over the next century. That’s not as alarming as it sounds. Sea level has risen at the lower end of that projection over the past two centuries. • There will be more extreme droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Natural disasters (they’re called “natural” for a reason, right?) will occur with or without increased man-made emissions. Having failed repeatedly to win legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama administration appears bent on taking the regulatory route. The Environmental Protection Agency is promulgating stringent emission standards for new power plants that would effectively prohibit construction of coal-fired generators and prematurely shut down existing plants. The EPA also has introduced costly new air-quality standards for hydraulically fractured wells and new fuel-efficiency standards that will make cars and light-duty trucks more expensive, smaller and less safe. Restricting greenhouse gas emissions, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, will impose huge costs on consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole. Congress should exercise its seldom-used muscles as regulatory watchdog to keep regulatory proposals that are not cost-effective from full implementation and reverse the administration’s course on regulating CO2. As for the president’s suggestion that unilateral action by the U.S. will somehow inspire other countries to emulate our example — the repeated failure of U.N. negotiations to produce multilateral climate action demonstrates a near universal disinclination to sacrifice economic growth on the altar of global warming. President Obama should respond to the threat of climate change by acknowledging that the severity of the threat is low and the costs of action are painfully high. And that unilateral action by the United States won’t make a dent in Earth’s temperature anyway.

## 1ar

### 1ar – cp

### 1ar – dip cap

#### No disease impact

Keller 13 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder (Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

Periodic media reports of bird flu, a new SARS-like virus and a case of drug-resistant tuberculosis have kept the world informed, but they have also contributed to a distorted perception of the true threat such contagions pose. Perhaps the greatest value of the media coverage is the opportunity it provides to discuss the uncertainties and the best ways to prepare for biological threats, both natural and man-made. It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### Warming not a threat to heg

Kagan 08 – Resident Scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, Frederick, Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, Center for a New American Security, June, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf

#### In recent years it has become clear that the problem of climate change will play an increasing role in the formulation and execution of American economic strategy, a key part of U.S. grand strategy. The relative priority given to climate change in Europe, the United States, China, and elsewhere has introduced new strains into international relations and added further complexity to the problems of modernizing developing states. The challenge of climate change in the coming decades is likely to be indirect—global weather trends are unlikely to affect the United States dramatically and directly in any time frame appropriate for developing grand strategy, nor is it likely that any conceivable combination of American and global policies will affect such trends very much in the coming decades. The determination to address climate change, however, will place additional burdens on the American (and the global) economy, add distortions to the market, and contribute to international tensions. Climate change is not, as many Europeans would have it, the preeminent security challenge of our era, but neither can it be left out of consideration in the development and execution of grand strategy.

#### No prolif or cascades, and the timeframe is huge – their ev is biased

Kahl 13 – Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Colin H., Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf>)

\*\*\*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR\*\*\*

I I I . LESSONS FRO M HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

**Environmental leadership fails**

**Matthew 96** (Richard A., Assistant Professor of Environmental Politics and International Relations – Georgetown University, Issues in Science & Technology, Fall, 13(1), p. 39)

Moreover, the foreign counterparts of U.S. officials often are **uncomfortable** with U.S. leadership, even when little can be accomplished without it. Especially in the Third World, aggressive environmental initiatives tend to be perceived as attempts to fix the status quo by **burdening** the development process with **constraints** and **shifting the costs** of the North’s “mistakes” onto the South. China, Indonesia, Brazil, and many other states are **wary** of proposals that seek to modify the strategies through which they are pursuing economic growth. And although the United States is the only superpower, it is no longer able to control the global agenda as it did after World War II. It now has to persuade other countries that environmental policies are in their interest.